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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 27 SPRING 1952 Number 3
INJUNCTION WITHOUT SANCTION:
THE IRANIAN FIASCO
FRANK E. MALONEY*
In our Anglo-American system of law the interlocutory injunction
is an efficient remedy for the preservation of the status quo pendente
lite. It is the purpose of the writer to attempt an evaluation of the use-
fulness of this remedy in international law. Emphasis will be placed
on the failure of the remedy in the current Anglo-Iranian oil dispute,
and an analysis of the reasons for that failure and its probable effect
on the future use of the interlocutory injunction by the International
Court of Justice will be undertaken.
Any discussion of the use of the interlocutory injunction in inter-
national law necessarily involves the presumption that such injunctions
are employed by international tribunals. Both the Permanent Court of
International Justice and its successor, the present International Court
of Justice, have on occasion issued interim orders designed to preserve
the status quo during the interval until final adjudication on the merits
of controversies pending before them. Some authorities would not
dignify these orders by the appellation "injunction," since for them the
term carries with it the notion of an efficient enforcement mechanism
backed by the power to punish disobedience through contempt proceed-
ings as well as other coercive sanctions.' No such enforcement mech-
anism has yet been developed in the field 9 f international law.
' If we agree, however, that a study of the injunctive order and
of its enforcement involves two separate though interrelated problems,
* B.A. 1938, University of Toronto; LL.B. 1942, University of Florida; Graduate
Fellow, Columbia University School of Law, 1950-1951; Professor of Law, University
of Florida. This article is based in part on a paper presented to the 1951 meeting of
the Equity Round Table of the Association of American Law Schools as a part of
the discussion of an address by Professor Lester B. Orfield, Temple University, on
"The Use of the Injunction in International Disputes", the substance of which is repro-
duced in 40 Geo. L.J. 399-426 (1951). Professor Maloney-is Chairman of the 1952-1953
Equity Round Table Council.
1. This criticism was voiced at the Equity Round Table disctsion on "The Use of
the Injunction in International Disputes," supra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the similarity between Anglo-American interlocutory injunctions and
the interirh orders of the International Court of Justice becomes ap-
parent. Both are used for the purpose of preserving the status quo
pendente lite, and hence assume that a controversy is pending before the
court.2  In both the Anglo-American and international law fields requests
for such interlocutory relief take priority over routine business.3 In
both, opportunity is presehted for prompt argument before the intei-
locutory order is issued ;4 and if the motion for interim protection is
granted, relief in the International Court, like Anglo-American injunc-
tive relief, takes the form of an order to the defendant designed to pre-
serve the status quo pending final adjudication of the controversy.5 Thus
in the interim order the International Court is employing the equivalent
of the Anglo-American interlocutory injunction, though under a differ-
ent name.
The two remedies differ sharply, however, as to their enforceability
against a recalcitrant defendant. In the Anglo-American system the
primary enforcement mechanism is the contempt proceeding. The in-
junctive remedy was developed by the English Chancery Court; and,
because of the position of the early chancellors as direct representatives
of the king issuing orders in his name, speedy punishment for disobedi-
ence of such orders became an accepted part of Anglo-American juris-
prudence.6
In the system of law that developed on the European continent,
on the other hand, whereas specific relief, when feasible, has been pre-
ferred to damages, 7 the usual method of enforcing decrees for such
relief has been through execution in natwra rather than by in personam
2. See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942,
554 (1943); WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY § 57 (1930).
3. See 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Art. 61, 2,
HUDSON, op. cit. supr note 2, at 748.
4. Id. 8. The President of the International Court has on occasion issued the
equivalent of an ex Parte temporary restraining order designed to preserve the status
quo pending such argument. See the Belgian-Chinese Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A., No. 8(1927), 2 Hudson, World Ct. Rep. 3; Dumbauld, Relief Pendente Lite in the Pern'anent
Court of International Justice;39 Am. J. INT'L L. 391, 404 (1945).
5. See HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 533. As yet the International Court has
not developed a means of protecting the defendant as a condition to granting interim
relief similar to the Anglo-American requireinent that complainant post a bond as a
condition to obtaining interlocutory relief, but it has been argued that the Court has
the power to require security in such cases. See DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 162 (1932).
'6. See Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 1, 3, 104 (1927); Maloney,
Injunctive Law Enforcement: Leaven or Secret Weapon, 1 MERCER L REv. 1, 20 (1949).
7. HUSTON, THE ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY c. iii (1915) ; WALSH, A.
TREATISE ON EQUITY 300 (1930); Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv.
L. REV. 641, 647 (1923).
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punishment for contempt.8 Some continental codes have specifically
abolished personal arrest as a civil enforcement sanction, 9 and even in
those countries such as Germany and Austria, where confinement has
been used to coerce obedience to civil decrees, sequestration of assets is
the preferred sanction and confinement as a sanction occupies a strictly
secondary position. 10 It seems fair to conclude that while the equitable
remedy of specific performance has its parallels in the continental sys-
tems, a civil remedy similar to the Anglo-American injunction with its
ancillary contempt proceeding has been slow in developing." Inter-
national law as reflected by the decisions of the Permanent Court of
International Justice has likewise been slow to adopt the injunctive
remedy.
Injunctive orders may be either interlocutory or on the merits.
Sufficient authority for the International Court to grant injunctive relief
following adjudication on the merits may be found in Article 38 of the
Statute of the Court empow#ering it to apply "the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations,': 2  The Court, however, has not as
yet found occasion to employ the injunction in lieu of or as an adjunct
to a judgment on the merits,' 3 though it has resorted to interlocutory
injunctive relief on more than one occasion. In these cases we might
expect to find the remedy freed of its Anglo-American limitations,' 4
8. Chafee, Injiunction, 8 ENcyc. Soc. Scr. 53, 57 (1932).
9. E.g., Italy; see DUMBAULD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 63. In none of the Latin
states does one find the contempt proceeding. As Pekelis has put it, "this very concept
of contempt simply does not belong to the world of ideas of a Latin lawyer." Pekelis,
Legal Techniques and Political Idealogies: A Comparative Study, 41 MIcH. L. REV.
665, 668 (1943); see Brodeur, The Injmction in French Jurisprudence, 14 TULANE IL
Rnv. 211 (1940).
10. Du B UALD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 42-50; Neitzel, Specific Performance, In-
junctions, and Damages in the German Law, 22 HARv. L. Rnv. 161, 174, 181 (1909).
11. This was the conclusion of the drafting committee of the League of Nations.
See the Phillimore report of March 20, 1918, DuMRAuLD, op. cit. supra note 5, Annex 1.
12. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT oF JUsTIcE Art. 38, § 1c. This provi-
sion in turn is copied from Art. 38, § 3, of the statute of its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice. Judge Manley 0. Hudson in a concurring opinion in
the Diversion of Waters from the Meuse Case has pointed out that under Art. 38 "the
Court has some freedom to consider principles of equity as part of the International
law which it must apply." P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70, 4, 77 (1937), 4 Hudson, World
Ct. Rep. 178, 232. See Jenks, Equity as a Part of the Law Applied by the Permanent
Court of International Justice, 53 L. Q. REv. 519 (1937).,
13. The final-type injunction is not a complete stranger to international law, how-
ever. Such an injunction was recently granted by the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal,
which ordered Canada to stop its nationals from operating a smelter in such a way
as to send noxious fumes into the State of Washington. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tri-
bunal Decision, 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). It may be pertinent to note, however,
that the tribunal was adjudicating a dispute between Anglo-American nations in which
the injunction is an integral part of the national jurisprudence.14. Judge Hudson in his concurring opinion in the Diversion of Waters from the
Meuse Case states; "A sharp division between law and equity, such as prevails in the
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such as the requirement of inadequacy of a money judgment or other
so-called legal remedy, and the restriction to use solely for the protection
of property rights.'I  But as yet the injunction as used by the Inter-
national Court apparently has not developed beyond these limitations,
protection of property rights being involved in all three of the cases in
which the remedy has been employed to grant interim relief ;"6 and the
Court has' been very hesitant to "indicate" the remedy when payment of
indemnity is available as alternate relief.17
It is, of course, difficult to draw valid conclusions from the few
cases in which quasi-injunctive relief has been discussed by the Inter-
national Court of Justice, but it seems questionable whether the Court
is as yet prepared, even pendente lite, to adopt the approach of the Ameri-
can Law Institute, which advocates the use of the injunction in all cases
where other remedies are not as efficient to the ends of justice.'8 Once
the Court decides to use the remedy, however, it apparently will, in true
equity fashion, "fit the punishment to the crime" and "suggest" the
measures it thinks appropriate, regardless of the exact relief proposed by
the applicant.' 9
Why have interim injunctions been employed so infrequently by
the Court? A number of reasons suggest themselves. One is the lack
of an adequate enforcement mechanism. 20 A second reason is connected
with the method by which many cases reach the Court. Only states
may be parties before the Court.2 1  But in cases similar to the Iranian
case the directly injured party is a national of the complaining state,
not the complaining state itself. In such cases the national must per-
suade his sovereign to espouse his cause, thus converting it into a gov-
ernment claim capable of being placed before the international tribunal.2 2
administration of justice in some States, should find no place in international jurispru-
dence.. . ." P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70, 4, 76 (1937), 4 Hudson, World Ct. Rep. 178, 232.
15. This limitation was first clearly enunciated by Lord Eldon in Gee v. Pritchard,
2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 674 (1818).
16. Belgian-Chinese Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A. No. 8 (1927), 2 Hudson, World Ct.
Rep. 3; Electricity Co. Case, P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 79 (1939), 4 Hudson World Ct.
Rep. 388; Iranian Case, I.C.J. 89 (1951). Protection of property rights was also in-
volved when injunctive relief was granted in the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal decision
in 1941; sec. 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
17. Southeastern Greenland Case, P.,C.IJ., Ser. A/B, No. 48, at 288-289 (1932),
3 Hudson, World Ct. Rep. 81, 95-96; see Belgian-Chinese Case, supra note 16, at 7.
18. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 933, Special Note (1934).
19. Such a suggestion broi'rio motu was made in the Iranian case, where the Court
suggested the establishment of a board of supervisors. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case,
Order of July 5, 1951, I.C.J. 89, 93 (1951). See note 50 infra.
20. See pages 338, 348 infra.
21. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE Art. 34, § 1.
22. See Koessler, Government Espousal of Private Claims before InternationaL
Tribunals, 13 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 180 (1946).
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"But the sovereign may be reluctant td espouse the cause because of
possible political repercussions 23 and before intervening may insist that
the national exhaust his remedies in the courts of the offending nation.2 4
By the time these remedies have been pursued, any need for an inter-
locutory order to preserve the status quo is long past. Only if the
sovereign is directly concerned, as is the case in the Iranian dispute where
Great Britain herself is a majority stockholder in the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, is the intervention likely to come soon enough to make an
interim injunction of any value.
Before discussing the Iranian case in detail, it may be useful at
this point to trace briefly the history of interim injunctive relief in inter-
national law. The idea of giving an international tribunal authority to
issue interim orders to preserve the status quo apparently had its origin
in the Convention establishing the Central American Court of Justice
in 1907.25 That Court made use of this power on one occasion to inter-
dict military activity threatening to disturb the peace among Central
American nations,26 and twice to attempt to preserve the status quo pend-
ing a determination whether a grant of interoceanic canal rights to the
United States by Nicaragua violated the rights of other nations.2 7 Simi-
23. Thus the United States refused to bring the Mexican Oil Expropriation cases
before the Court; see Koessler, supra note 22, at 188.
24. The United States imposed this requirement on the Standard Oil Company in
the Bolivian confiscation case, and apparently also in the Mexican expropriation cases.
See Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 327, 371 et seq. (1940); see
Note, 97 U. OF PA. L. Rxv.' 79, 93 n. 115 (1948), to the effect that exhaustion of
remedies in the courts of the defendant nation is a prerequisite to the exercise. of diplo-
matic remedies.
25. Article 15 of the Convention for the Establishment of the Court provided:
"From the moment in which any suit is instituted against any one or more governments
up to that in which a final decision has been pronounced, the court may at the
solicitation of any one of the parties fix the situation in which the contending parties
must remain, to the end that the difficulty shall not be aggravated and that things shall
be conserved in statn quo pending a final decision." DumuBaLD, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 95. See HUDsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, c. 3. Similar powers to issue interim orders
for the preservation of the status quo were given to the International Central American
Tribunal created by a Convention entered into in 1913 by the United States and 15 Central
American republics. DunmAUu, op. cit. supra note 5, at 102.
26. Honduras v. Salvador and Guatemala. A translation of the interloctury decree
will be found in 2 Am. J. INTL L. 838 (1908). The final decision is reprinted in 3
Am. J. INT'L L. 434-436, 729-736 (1909).
27. Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 5 Anales 87 (1916); El Salvador v. Nicaragua, 5
Anales 229, 6 Anales 96, 11 Air. J. INT'L L. 674 (1917). Both cases are summarized in
HuDsoN, TH. PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, 58-62 (1943).
In view of the events in the current Iranian case it is interesting to note that in Costa
Rica v. Nicaragua the latter country, like Iran, denied the jurisdiction of the Court,
disregarded an interim order, failed to appear or submit a reply to Costa Rica, and
notified the Court that it would not abide by an adverse decision. It is also interesting to
note that, following these, two decisions adversely affecting the interests of the United
States, this country, which originally bad strongly urged the establishment of the Court,
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lar provisions for the interdiction of military activity and the preserva-
tion of the status quo were incorporated in a number of treaties between
the United States and other countries negotiated during the term of
office of Secretary of State Bryan.28  This provision of the "Bryan
Treaties" in turn served as the basis for Article 41 of the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice. 29 Unfortunately the com-
mittee drafting the statute failed to stipulate any penalties for disobedi-
ence to the interim measures provided for by the statute and provided
only that the Court might "indicate" such measures. In view of this
omission of sanctions, it was the feeling of some authorities that such
indications of interim measures by the -Permanent Court of International
Justice were mere suggestions and carried no obligatory force. 30  On
those occasions when interim measures were indicated by that court,31
however, they were in each case voluntarily complied with, and the
question of employing sanctions did not arise. I
In the wake of World War II, when the United Nations Organi-
zation replaced the old League of Nations as keeper of world
peace, the International Court of Justice became the United Nations'
arbiter of legal disputes, replacing the Permanent Court of International
Justice in that capacity. The statut of the new court gave it the same
power to indicate interim measures that had been possessed by its
predecessor. 32  In addition, however, the United Nations Charter pro-
vided a possible enforcement mechanism by conferring on the Security
Council the right "to make recommendations or decide upon measures
to be taken to give effect to the judgment" rendered by the Court.33 Was
an effective sanction f6r the enforcement of interim orders thus created?
has been accused of failure to work toward a renewal of the Court's life when the
convention creating it expired. See DrMBAULD, Op. cit. s=pra note 5, at 95, n. 4.
28. Such provisions may be found in treaties with Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua,
Salvador, Persia, China, France, and Sweden. DUMBAULD, op. cit. siupra note 5, at 99.
The treaties are collected in a Carnegie publication, TREATIES FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PFAcE (1920).
29. Ibid. See HUDSbN, supra note 2, at 425.
30. DUMBAULD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1689; Hostie, The Statute of the Perna-
nent Court of Internatioial Justice, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 407, 427 (1945). Contra: HUDSON,
op. cit. supra note 27, at 425-426; see also Hudson, The Thirtieth Year of the World
Court, 46 Am. J. INTL L. 1, 23 (1952).
31. Belgian-Chinese Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 8 (1927), 2 Hudson World Ct
Rep. 3; Electricity Co. Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 79 (1939), 4 Hudson, World Ct.
Rep. 388.
32. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE Art. 41. This article is
an exact copy of Art. 41 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
33. U. N. CHARTER Art. 94, § 2. Whether an interim order can be classed as a
"judgment" is one of the problems to be discussed in this article. See page 350 infra.
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The current Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case34 unfortunately indicates
a negative answer to that question.
Let us now examine the background of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany case. Relationships between Iran (then Persia) and the company
began in 1901, when the Persian Government granted William D'Arcy,
a British national, a 60-year concession to extract and, export Persian
oil. 5 Persia cancelled this concession in 1932 but entered into a new
60-year concession agreement in 1933 after Britain appealed the can-
cellation to the Council of the League of Nations. This new con-
cession gave the company the exclusive right to extract petroleum
throughout Persia.37 Article 21 provided:
This Concession shall not be annulled by the Government
and the terms therein contained shall not be altered either by
general or special legislation in the future, or by administrative
measures or any other acts whatever of the executive authori-
ties.
Article 22 further provided:
Any differences between the parties of any nature what-
ever and in particular any differences arising out of the inter-
pretation of this Agreement and of the rights and obligations
therein contained . . . shall be settled by arbitration.
In case arbitration became necessary, each party was to appoint an
arbitrator and the two arbitrators were to appoint an umpire. If one
of the parties failed to appoint an arbitrator within sixty days the Inter-
national Court on request of either party could appoint a sole arbitrator.38
The Convention of 1933 provided that Persia should be paid a
royalty of four shillings a ton on all petroleum distributed, plus twenty
per cent of the distribution to the ordinary stockholders. 39 This basis
34. I.C.J. Rep. 1951, p. 89, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 789 (1951).
35. After oil was discovered in 1908 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was organized
to take over the concession. The Government of the United Kingdom acquired a
majority interest in the company in 1914. See Hudson, The Thirtieth Year of the World
Court, 46 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1952).
36. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 2296 (1932) ; see LEAGUE OF NATIONS
OFFICIAL JOURNAL 197-211, 827, 1606 (1933).
37. The 1933 concession is set out in LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFICIAL JOURNAL 1653
(1933).
38. Concession of 1933, Art. 22D.
39. Id. Art. 10. Henry F. Grady, United States Ambassador to Iran during the
current negotiations, states that the Iranians were receiving only about 15% of the oil
company's net proceeds. Grady, What Went Wrong in Iran, The Saturday Evening Post,
Jan. 5, 1952, pp. 30, 57. This 15% figure is consistent with the 20T figure provided in
the Concession, since the 20% was not 20% of the net profits, but of the distribution
to stockholders.
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for distribution, although it gave the company the lion's share of the
profits, wa6 at first satisfactory to Iran. But the Iranians noted with
interest the successful Mexican expropriation of American oil conces-
sions,40 an expropriation which was followed by an operating agree-
ment under which Mexico received the major part of the companies'
profits from the working of the expropriated wells.41  Mexico's action
naturally led the Iranians to begin thinking along similar lines. Fuel
was added to the fire when the Arabian American Oil Company began
negotiating an agreement with Saudi Arabia for equal sharing of profits
from its Arabian operations. 42  In July 1949, in an attempt to satisfy
Iran, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company offered the Iranians a supple-
mentary agreement under which they would receive approximately thirty
per cent of the company's net profits, but after a year of wrangling this
supplemental agreement was finally rejected and in March 1951 the
Iranian Majlis and Senate declared the oil industry nationalized. 43
Britain then offered Iran an agreement for equal sharing of profits, but
the offer came too late and was likewise rejected.44
When Iran refused a British request for arbitration and the British
became convinced that Iran was determined to carry through its national-
ization plans, the United Kingdom on May 26, 1951, instituted proceed-
ings before the International Court of, Justice,45 petitioning the Court
to declare Iran under a duty to arbitrate the dispute.46 Meanwhile Iran
was threatening to evict the British managerial staff of the oil company.
As a result, on June 21, 1951, Britain notified the President of the
Court that she planned to file a request for an interim injunction, and
asked the Coukt to call upon Iran not to further disturb the status quo,
pending argument on the motion for interim relief.47 The President of
the Court immediately telegraphed this request to Iran, and Iran as
40. See Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 327 (1940).
41. Grady, supra note 39, at 58.
42. See statement of Sir William Fraser, C.B.E., Chairman to the stockholders of
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, N. Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1951, p. 6F. Grady states that
an international oil company in Iraq is paying royalties on a similar 50-50 basis. Grady,
supra note 39.
43. Ibid. The 30% figure is taken from Grady, supra note 39.
44. Grady, supra note 39.
45. The request may be found in International 'Court of Justice, 1951, General
List, No. 16. See also Bishop, The i4nglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, 45 Am. 3. INT'L L.
749, 752 (1951).
46. Britain also requested the Court to appoint a sole arbitrator under the provi-
sions of the Convention of 1933 (see note 38 supra), but the Court refused to grant this
relief. I.C.J. Yearbook, 1950-1951, p. 48. See Hudon, The Thirtieth Year of the World
Court, 46 AM. 3. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1952).
47. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, Request for the Indication of Interim Measures
of Protection (United Kingdom/Iran), I.C.J, Rep. 1951, p. 89, 45 Am 3. INT'L L. 789,
791 (1951).
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promptly rejected the overture on the ground that the Court lacked
jurisdiction.48
On June 22d Britain filed its prayer for interim measures, 49 and
the Court set June 30th as the date for hearings on the motion. Iran
failed to appear at the hearings. On July 5th' the Court issued an opinion
granting interim relief and providing for the establishment of a "board
of supervisors" to run the concession pending final adjudication of the
dispute.50
48. Ibid.
49. The reasons given by Britain as justifying interim relief included the following:
the danger of losing skilled personnel; Iranian interference with management of the
company would result in disrupting the enterprise; loss of markets and good will.
See Request for Indication of Interim Measures, supra note 45, at 6-12. For the measures
requested see 45 Am. J. IN 'L L. 789, 790 (1951).
50. The Indication reads as follows:
"THE COURT
"Indicates, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted on May
26th, 1951 by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland against the Imperial Government of Iran, the following
provisional measures which will apply on the basis of reciprocal observance:
1. That the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom Government
should each ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights
of the other Party in respect of the carrying out of any decision on the merits
which the Court may subsequently render; .
2. That the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom Government
should each ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate
.or extend the dispute submitted to the Court;
3. That the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom Government
should each ensure that no measure of any kind should be taken designed to-
hinder the carrying on of the industrial and commercial operations of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, Limited, as they were carried on prior to May 1st, 1951;
4. That the Company's operations in Iran should continue under the direc-
tion of its management as it was constituted prior to May 1st, 1951, subject
to such modifications as may be brought about by agreement with the Board
of Supervision referred to in paragraph 5;
5. That, in order to ensure the full effect of the preceding provisions, which
in any case retain their own authority, there should be established by agreement
between the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom Government a Board
to be known as the Board of Supervision composed of two Members appointed
by each of the said Governments and a fifth Member, who should be a national
of a third State and should be chosen by agreement between these Governments,
or, in default of such agreement, and upon the joint request of the Parties, by
the President of the Court.
"The Board will have the duty of ensuring that the Company's operations
are carried on in accordance with the provisions above set forth. It will, inter
alia, have the duty of auditing the revenue and expenses and of ensuring that
all revenue in excess of the sums required to be paid in the course of the normal
carrying on of the operations and the other normal expenses incurred by the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, are paid into accounts at banks to be
selected by the Board on the undertaking of such banks not to dispose of such
funds except in accordance with the decisions of the Court or the agreement
of the Parties."
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of
Protection (United Kingdom/Iran), I.C.J. Rep. 1951, p. 89, 45 Am. J. INT'L L.
789, 793 (1951).
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When Iran refused to accede to the order of the Court and proceeded
with plans for nationalization of the industry, Britain on September 2,
1951, finally asked the United Nations Security Council to call on Iran
to obey the Court's order. 51  Iran in turn challenged the jurisdiction of
the Council, Premier Mossadegh appearing in person on October 15th
for this purpose. 52  Britain was unable to line up the necessary seven
members of the Council behind its request and after considerable dis-
cussion the Council finally refused to take any action until the Court
passed on the disputed question of jurisdiction.5 3  It was not until De-
cember 8, 1951, that Iran finally agreed to appear to argue the question
of jurisdiction.54 As yet the Court has not ruled on this issue. By
the time it does the suggested interim measures will be beyond any
possible execution or value. The British have left Iran, the refineries
are closed, and the country stands on the verge of bankruptcy but
solidly united in its determination to carry through the nationalization
program.
Does Iran have any substantial basis for her position that'the Inter-
national Court lacks jurisdiction in the case, and, if so, what is the
relationship of this issue to the duty of Iran to obey the interim order?
The question of jurisdiction would seem to be an extremely close one.
Iran claims that her dispute is with the oil company, not the British
Government, and that the Statute of the Court provides that it has
jurisdiction only over disputes between states.55 But once the claim has
been espoused by the British Government, under international law it
becomes a government claim subject to adjudication before the Inter-
national Court. 56 This doctrine traces back at least to the time of Vat-
tel,57 and while there is some dispute as to whether the sovereign is act-
ing to avenge an injury to itself or in the capacity of parens patriae for
51. N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1951, pp. 1, 5, Sept. 30, p. 4.
52. N. Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1951, p. 6.
53. N. Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1951, pp. 1, 3. Previously India and Yugoslavia had
proposed weakening amendments to the British resolution that the Council should
call upon Iran to resume negotiations (N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1951, pp. 1, 10). It
finally became apparent that Britain could hope for only six votes in favor of its
resolution, whereas seven were necessary (see U. N. CHAR= Art. 27) even in the
absence of a possible Russian veto, and as a result she acceded to a French motion to
postpone further action until the Court passed on the question of jurisdiction. N. Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1951, pp. 1, 3. For further details see, Liang, The Question of Domestic
Jurisdiction in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dspute Before the Security Council, 46 Am. J.
IxT'L L. 272, 275-277, 281 (1952).
54. N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1951, p. 11; see Hudson, supra note 35, at 16. Iran
finally filed its plea to the jurisdiction of the Court on Feb. 4, 1952. N. Y. Times,
Feb. 5, 1952, p. 3. Britain's answer to this plea was due May 27, 1952.
55. See note 21 supra.
56. Koessler, supra note 22.
57. 2 VATTE, LE DROIT DES GENS § 71 (1758).
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the benefit of its national, 58 as did the Emperor of Austria when seek-
ing an injunction in the English chancery court in the case of Emperor
.of Austria v. Day & Kassuth,59 the International Court has recognized
the standing of the sovereign in such cases.
60
The jurisdiction of the Court, however, even in disputes between
states, must be based on the previous consent of the parties. Article 36
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides for such
consent, which will establish compulsory jtirisdiction in relation to any
other state accepting the same obligation. The Statute provides that
this consent may be given as to four classes of disputes:
a. The interpretation of a treaty;
b. Any question of international law;
c. The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute
a breach of an international obligation;
d. The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation.61
Britain has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in all four classes of
disputes,0 2 but the Iranian declaration, made in 1932, was limited to
"situations or facts relating directly or indirectly to the application of
treaties or conventions accepted by Persia [now Iran] and subsequent
to the ratification of this declaration." 63  This declaration would argu-
ably limit compulsory reciprocal jurisdiction to the first class of disputes
mentioned in Article 36 of the Statute, namely, the interpretation of
treaties. But the present dispute grows out of the unilateral termination
by Iran of a concession contract or "Convention" entered into in 1933
between the Government of Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 64,
If Iran had accepted jurisdiction in all four classes of cases provided for
in the Statute, the Court could base jurisdiction on the ground that
Britain, by espousing the Oil Company's claim, had turned it into a
state claim, the rejection of which constitutes a breach of an international
58. Koessler, supra note 22, at 186 et seq.
59. 3 De G.F. & J. 217 (C. App. 1861).
60. Judgment No. 2 (jurisdiction) concerning the Mavromatis Palestine Conces-
sion, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 2 (1924), 1 Hudson, World Ct. Rep. 293, 301-302.
61. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTIcE Art. 36, § 2.
62. Fenwick, The Order of the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. Case, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 723, 724 (1951).
63. Seventh Annual Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 7; see Bishop, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, 45 Am. J. INT'L L.
749, 754 (1951).
,64. 14 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 1653 (1933); see Bishop, mpra
note 63.
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obligation. But where, as in this case, jurisdiction is limited to the
interpretation of treaties, it is open to question whether a convention
with a national becomes a treaty in the sense of the Statute of the
court simply by its espousal by the government of that national. 5
Assuming, however, that the dispute falls within Section 2(a) of
Article 36 of the Statute, there remains Iran's objection that the dispute
is one falling exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, and
hence is beyond the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
Most states when accepting compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 of
the Statute made reservations as to matters of domestic jurisdiction,
and Iran in its declaration excepted disputes with regard to questions
which by international law fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of
that state.6 6  A similar limitation as to all United Nations action is
found in Article II, par. 7, of the United Nations Charter.67  However,
in the absence of express reservations in the declaration accepting com-
pulsory jurisdiction,68 the question of what lies within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state is a matter for interpretation -by the International
Court of Justice.69 What are matters of domestic jurisdiction which
are excluded from the consideration of the Court? Matters of immigra-
65. Great Britain is also relying on a 1928 treaty made directly between Britain
and Iran, under which British nationals in Persia "... . shall be admitted and treated
on Persian territory in conformity with the rules and practice of international law."
See Fenwick, supra note 62, at 725. The applicability of this treaty, however, depends
on the meaning of the words "subsequent to the ratification of this declaration" found
in the Persian declaration of 1932 accepting compulsory jurisdiction in "situations or
facts relating directly or indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions ac-
cepted by Persia and subsequent to the ratification of this declaration." If subsequent
relates to "treaties," as it would appear, Persia did not accept jurisdiction as to the
1928 treaty. Britain, however, claims that the word "subsequent" relates to "situations
or facts" rather than treaties. If the British interpretation should be accepted by the
Court, the 1928 treaty can provide a basis for jurisdiction to determine whether Iran,
in nationalizing its oil industry, is treating the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company "in con-
formity with the rules and practice of international law."
66. See note 63 supra.
67. "Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
charter...." See N-ote The-"Domieitic Jurisdiction" Liizdtation in the United Nations
Charter, 47 COL. L. REv. 268 (1947).
68. Thus the United States has reserved the right to determine for itself what
constitutes matters of domestic jurisdiction.- See Hudson, The World Court: Ainerica's
Declaration Accepting Jurisdiction, 32 A.B.A.J. 832 (1946). For an article questioning the
validity of this reservation see, Lawson, The Problem of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of
the World Court, 46 Am. J.INT'L L. 219 (1952).
69. Decision in the Franco-British Tunisian dispute, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4 (1923);
see Gregory, An Important Decision by the Permanent Court of Internatiotal Justice,
.17 AM. J. INT'L L. 298 et seq. (1923). The Statute of the Court provides: "In the
event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled
by the decision of the .Court." STATUTE OF tmE INTERATIONAL COURT OF JUsTIcE Art.
36, § 6.
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tion, naturalization, and tariffs are usually considered protected by the
clause.70  But the Court has stated that when a treaty between the
parties covers the problem in issue it becomes an "engagement of inter-
national character," and hence within the jurisdiction of the Court.7 1
To except the Anglo-Iranian case from the domestic jurisdiction limita-
tion on this basis, it will be necessary for the Court to include in such
"iengagements" international "conventions" as well as treaties, for there
must be a showing that the engagements apply to the facts in dispute in
order that the matter be considered non-domestic. 2
It would appear, then, that the issue of jurisdiction is one as to
which there is real doubt, but, as the court has stated, "it cannot be
accepted a priori that such a complaint falls completely outside the
scope of international jurisdiction. '73
If we agree that the Court may reasonably find that it has jttris-
diction, should it be required to determine this issue definitively before
issuing an interim order to preserve the status quo? In taking the posi-
tion that it can issue the order before determining the question of juris-
diction, the Court is in accord with Anglo-American decisions as to the
use of the interlocutory injunction at a similar stage;74 and any other
position would allow a violator to avoid the interim order in any case
by the simple expedient of questioning the jurisdiction of the Court.
Suppose, however, that the Court, after issuing an interim order,
later determines that it does not in fact have jurisdiction, and meanwhile
the defendant, as in the case of Iran, has ignored the interim order. Is
any penalty to be attached to disobedience if this order is void for lack
of jurisdiction, or is the defendant free to take his chances that the
Court will finally agree with his position as to its jurisdiction? The
traditional Anglo-American view would seemingly regard the void order
as a nullity which could be disregarded with impunity.7 5 But the recent
70. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4 (Advisory Opinion on nationality decrees issued in
Tunis and Morocco Feb. 7, 1923), 1 Hudson, World Ct. Rep. 143, 156; see Gregory,
supra note 69; Note, supra note 67, at 273.
71. Advisory Opinion, supra note 70.
72. Id. at 64, 1 Hudson World Ct. Rep. at 157.
73. I.C.J. Rep. 89 (1951), 45 Am. J. INT'L L 789, 792 (1951).
74. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), Carter v. United
States, 135 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1943) ; cf. Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9 (1855) ;
see 5 HoLDswoRTH, HisTORy OF ENGLISH LAW 325 (2d ed. 1937). Two of the judges
would have required the International Court of Justice to go further and decide provi-
sionally that it was competent to hear the case before issuing an interim order. See
Fenwick, supra note 62, at 727. Such a requirement might unwarrantedly delay interim
measures in a case where speed is of the essence.
75. lit re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); it re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); see.
HIGH, INJTUNCTIONS § 1425 (4th ed. 1905) ; Cox, The Void 'Order and the Duty to Obey,
16 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 86 (1948).
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decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States
v. United M1ine Workers" seemingly commits the American courts to
the proposition that the court may have a sort of jurisdiction to deter,
mine jurisdiction in cases in which real doubt exists and that this juris-
diction will support contempt proceedings for failure to obey a tem-
porary restraining order during the period when the court is determining
its own jurisdiction." It has been argued that this new doctrine applies
only to jurisdiction over the subject matter, not jurisdiction over the
person,78 but a more fundamental objection to the application of the
United Mine Workers' doctrine in international law is the inability of
the Court to secure punishment of a violator of a void order. If the
Security Council, the enforcement agency for orders of the International
Court, will not even "note" an indication of the Court prior to a decisi6n
by the Court on the issue of jurisdiction,79 it seems highly unlikely that
it will take steps to punish disobedience of such an interim order when
jurisdiction is later determined to be lacking. For those who agree with
the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes that "the foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power,"80 the void order may well be considered a nullity.
This raises thewhole question of enforcement of judgments and
orders of the International Court. Some followers of the positivist
school of jurisprudence would not even dignify the decisions of such a
court with the appellation "law" because of lack of effective enforcement
mechanism,"' and this objection may be applied with particular force
to interim measures "suggested" by the Court. While the framers of
the United Nations Charter sought to put teeth into the judgments of
the Court by conferring on the Security Council the right "to make
recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to
the judgment" rendered by the Court,82 as yet these teeth have never
been bared. Moreover, it may be questioned whether the "provisional
measures" provided for by Article 41 of. the Statute of the Court fall
76. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
77. " . . . the District Court unquestionably had the power to issue a restraining
order for the purpose of preserving existing conditions pending a decision upon its own
jurisdiction." Id. at 290 (dissenting opinion, Vinson, C. J.)
78. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLmEs OF EQuITY c. IX (1950) ; see Cox, supra note 75, at
87 et seq.
79. N. Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1951, pp. 1, 3.
80. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
81. Thus Austin classified international law as "positive international morality"
because "set and enforced by mere opinion." AusTIN, LECTURES 89, 177 (1873). See
PATrE~sox, AN INTRODUcTION To JUrSPRUDENcE § 2.34 (3d mimeo ed. 1949).
82. U.N. CHARTER Art. 94, § 2. This goes further than the power of the League
of Nations Council under Art. 13(4) of the League Covenant, since it could only
"propose" steps to be taken. See Sloan, Comparative International and Municipal Law
Sanctions, 27 NEB. L. REv. 1, 8 (1947).
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within the meaning of the term "judgment" as used in Article 94 of the
United Nations Charter.a3 But the same objection might be made as to
final injunctive orders of the Court; and such an interpretation would
strip international quasi-injunctive relief, interlocutory or final, of much
of its efficacy. This result would be in line with the view of such eminent
authorities as the late Professor Borchard, who believed that the "threat
of group force" would stifle "the atmosphere of harmony, trust, and
mutual respect ... indispensable to progress" and therefore "the attrac-
tions of organized force, so inherent in municipal law, must be vigorously
repudiated in the field of international law and relations to which it is
totally unsuited."184  Yet, in an age when the subjective viewpoint of the
individual state has replaced international principles of morality based
on natural law, 5 there is much to be commended in the approach of the
American Legal Realists who, taking the position that the words in the
United Nations Charter have no absolute meaning, would, where those
words are open to interpretation, so construe them as to strengthen
rather than weaken the one organization capable of enforcing judicially
invoked sanctions as a substitute for national self-help which might touch
off a third world debacle.80  From this viewpoint, it is arguable that the
Security Council had authority, when notified of the rejection of the
interim measures suggested by the Court,8 7 to "decide upon measures"
to give effect to those suggestions.
Such measures by the Security Council need not go to the extent of
using force. There are other weapons in the enforcement arsenal of
the United Nations. 8 These could include withdrawal of diplomatic
recognition by member states, including withdrawal of ambassadors or
even suspension of privileges 9 or expulsion" from the United Nations
itself. In addition, economic sanctions could be applied by member
83. The representative of Iran, in fact, raised this objection. See Liang supra note
53, at 276. Art. 41, § 1: "The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve
the respective rights of either party."
84. Borchard, The Place of Law and Courts in International Relations, 37 Am. J.
INT'I L. 46, 57 (1943).
85. It is generally conceded that Grotius founded the law of nations upon prin-
ciples of "natural law." See PATTRsoN, op. cit. supra note 81, at 132.
86. See McDougal and Gardner, The Veto and thw Charter: An Interpretation for
Survival, 60 YALE L. J. 258 (1951).
87. Art. 41, § 2 of the Statute provides for such notification.
88. For a full discussion of such sanctions see Sloan, supra note 82.
89. U.N. CHARTER Art. 5 provides for such suspension by the General Assembly
upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Privileges which might be suspended
include the privileges' of voting in the Assembly and participating in its deliberations.
90. Art. 6 of the Charter provides for expulsion by the General Assembly upon
recommendation of the Security Council of any member "which has persistently violated
the Principles" of the Charter.
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nations, such as export and import limitations, discriminatory duties, or
trade embargoes. Of course these sanctions may be applied unilaterally
by the injured state, but usually, to be effective, they will require con-
certed action by other members of the United Nations family. More-
over, there is the possibility of applying cross sanctions through the
withholding of privileges granted by other United Nations organs. The
use of collateral powers through the withholding or revocation of eco-
nomic privileges granted by sister agencies has proved a very effective
means of enforcing American administrative regulations. 1 While the
use of such cross sanctions has not been fully explored in the interna-
tional field, their possible effectiveness in the Iranian case is evidenced by
the effect of the American delay in implementing an Export-Import
Bank loan to Iran.92  As a result of failure to obtain these funds, while
Mossadegh may have wbn a technical legal battle against the Inter-
national Court, he is in danger of losing his war against Britain through
the impending bankruptcy of his nation.93 A loan to Iran is now being
considered by the World Bank.9  A refusal of that loan upon recom-
mendation of the Security Council might convince Iran of the desir-
ability of obeying the Court's order. 5
It may be well at this time to give some brief thought to the
present state of international law as to liability for expropriation of
foreign-owned property, 96 since any decision on the merits in the Iranian
91. See LANDIS, THE ADMINISaATIVE PROCESS 118-119 (1938).
92. See Grady, supra note 39, pp. 57-58. See also Time, Nov. 26, 1951, p. 38.
93. See Time, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 39.
94. See Time, Dec. 17, 1951, pp. 34, 36; N. Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1951, p. 1; Jan. 2,
1952, p. 8; Feb. 17, 1952, p. 1.
95. Kelsen puts his finger on the weakness of the Security Council enforcement
mechanism when he points out: "The latter [the Security Council] is not bound, it
is only authorized to take enforcement action under the conditions determined in Art.
39. It may, for political reasons, not be willing or, due to its voting procedure, not be
able to work. Since, on the other hand, self-help is, in principle, prohibited, a situation
may occur under the Charter where it is impossible to enforce the law against violations
other than those committed by armed attack (Art. 51). This is no improvement of
the legal status as it existed under the Covenant and even under general international
law prior to the Charter." Kelsen, Sanctions in International Law under the Charter of
the United Nations, 31 IowA L. REv. 499, 522-523 (1946). While Kelsen's criticism is
a valid one, his pure theory of law approach is in turn open to the criticism that it
fails to take sufficient account of the importance of political as compared with purely
legal considerations. In the Iranian case, for example, even if the Security Council
considered interfering with the loan, political considerations might cause it to pause,
for forcing Iran into bankruptcy might result in delivering that country. into the hands
of the Iranian Communists.
96. This problem was discussed by one of the speakers at the International Law
Round Table of the Association of American Law Schools at its 1951 meeting. For
this excellent treatment, with emphasis on the Iranian expropriation, see Re, The Na-
tionalization of Foreign-Owuned Property, 36 MINN L. REv. 323 (1952). See also Herz,
Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 243 (1941) ; Kunz, The Mexican
Expropriation, 17.N.Y.U.L.Q. 327 (1940).
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case will involve this question. Such a decision would be relevant to
the interim order because while the Security Council is unlikely to take
steps akin to criminal contempt proceedings for the purpose of punish-
ing Iran for violating that order, if Britain should prevail on the merits,
there remains the possibility of a court-imposed sanction'against Iran's
violation through an increase in the final award by way of a sort of civil
contempt judgment. 7
Traditionally international law writers have condemned confisca-
tion of foreign-owned property without compensation, but have recog-
nized the right of a sovereign to expropriate such property for reasons
of public utility by the exercise of a right akin to that of eminent domain,
provided such expropriation is followed by full and immediate com-
pensation. 98 We would like to believe that this principle of full and
immediate compensation would be recognized and accepted by the Inter-
national Court of Justice today, but it is necessary to recognize that this
requirement was developed in a nineteenth century laissez faire philo-
sophical climate which regarded the primary function of the state as the
protection of private property.99 Today with the abandonment of
"laissez faire" and the development of the concept of the "welfare"
state, some writers contend that measures bf nationalization are an ex-
tension of the police power of the state, and that, in the exercise of such
power, a state need not pay full compensation provided the foreign own-
ers receive equal treatment with nationals of the expropriating state. 00
Perhaps the method of final settlement of the American claims in the
Mexican Oil Expropriation cases' 01 is one indication of a developing
tendency toward a compromise position that expropriation for purposes
of fiationalization must be followed by "reasonable" compensation, which
does not necessarily mean full and immediate compensation. This com-
promise result may find justification both on the realistic ground that
half a loaf is better than none, and in the philosophic tenets of the
sociological jurisprudents who approach international law in terms of
97. If Iran should win on the merits, or the cause be settled by the parties, under
American jurisprudence there would no longer be any basis for an award akin to'a
civil contempt judgment. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911);
see Comment, 45 MIcH. L. REv. 469, 500 (1947).
98. Herz, supra note 96, at 253.
99. This concept of the sanctity of property rights found philosophic justification
in the writings of the English philosopher John Locke. See Loxa=, SEcOND TREATISE
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 122, 168 (Hafner ed. 1947).
100. See DE LAPRADLLE-NI Bor, 8 RmERTOIm a DBROIT INTERNATIONAL 51 et seq.
(1930), in which quotations from such authorities are collected by Basdevant; also see
Herz, supra note 96, at 252, 256-262.
101. Through the negotiation of long-term management contracts between Mexico
and companies whose properties had been expropriated. See Grady, supra note 39, at
58.
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'social ends1 0 2 and recognize that juristic theories to be workable must
conform to society's conception of those ends. The problem might be
looked upon in terms of a conflict between the Lockean law of nature
recognizing an immutable right to private property'"3 and the extreme
socialist position that no private right can stand in the way of social
advance.' 04 Lauterpacht points to the middle approach based on a mod-
ern "natural law with changing contents" aimed at promoting the social
ends of international society.' 0 5 Such a natural law theory, while recog-
nizing the right of the state to expropriate property in cases of social
necessity, would also recognize private property rights to the extent of
providing for just compensation for the, expropriated property, leaving
it to the Court to determine what is just in the individual case.' 06
Returning to the action of the Security Council in the Iranian case,
we may hazard some predictions as to its effect on future use of interim
measures by the International Court of Justice. As a result of the
Council's failure to back up the Court, it seems probable that this seldom
used equitable remedy will be employed even less frequently in the future.
Judges, being human, are interested in preserving the respect of their
litigants. When a court hands down a judgment, enforcement of that
judgment is outside the scope of its duties, and failure of the enforce-
ment mechanism is of no direct concern to the court. But when an
injunction, especially an interlocutory injunction, is disobeyed with im-
punity, the court loses face, and in all probability will not issue similar
decrees in like future situations.'10 No court likes to be told, in the
words of Andrew Jackson, "John Marshall has made his decision, now
let him enforce it.)'10S It will be most unfortunate if the Iranian case
102. See Liang, Roscoe Found and the Science of International Law, 22 TULANE L.
REv. 369 (1948).
103. LOCKE, op. cit. smpra note 99.
104. "The proletariat will ...wrest by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie,
to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State." MARx, Com-
MUNIST MANiFE To 41 (Moore trans. 1888). Among the first measures recommended
by Marx in communist controlled countries is "abolition of property in land and applica-
tion of all rents of land to public purposes." Ibid.
105. Lauterpacht forecasts "the renaissance" of this "natural law .. . into the
domain of international law .... ." LAUTERPAcHT, PR ATE LAW SouRcEs AND Ar.-T.oGiES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 58, n. 7 (1927).
106. Thus Iran, like Mexico, has offered to make compensation over a period of
years from ciiirent revenues of the expropriated. oil properties. See Time, June 4, 1951,
p. 32. If Iran could really guarantee such payments, they might today be looked upon
as just compensation.
107. Thus Re refers to "... the elementary principle of equity jurisprudence that
a Court of Chancery will not issue a vain decree, i.e., as a matter of expediency it
will not issue a decree where it does not possess means to enforce such decree." RE,
-FoREIGN CONFIScATIONS 34 (1951).
. 108. This famous utterance was the final footnote to Chief Justice Marshall's
decision in the Georgia Indian cases. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (U.S. 1832).
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should cause the Court to limit injunctive relief to litigation between
friendly nations in which there is a reasonable expectation of compli-
ance. 09 Such a result often would deprive injured parties of the pos-
sibility of protection through voluntary compliance with an injunctive
order.
At a time when the expansion of injunctive relief beyond the pro-
tection of property rights is an outstanding development in current
Anglo-American law, it would be doubly ironic to curtail even in prop-
erty cases its use in international law because of lack of effective sanc-
tions. In a way the fate of the interim order is linked with the fate of
the United Nations. In the Iranian case Britain chose to seek injunctive
relief rather than employ self-help. If British troops had moved into
Iran, they might have touched off World War III. Weakening the sanc-
tions behind interim injunctive orders may encourage such attempts at
self-help. The United Nations can ill afford to take that chance.
109. E.g., the order to Canada in the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal case to cease
operation of a smelter from which noxious fumes were drifting into the United States
is one with which voluntary compliance could be anticipated. See 35 Am. J. INT'L L.
684 (1941).
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